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ABSTRACT 
MONETARISM, FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY, 
AND THE 
MONETARIST EXPERIMENT 
Richard L. Cantrell July 19, 1994 62 Pages 
Directed by: Dr. Brian Goff 
Department of Economics Western Kentucky University 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the period between 
the fourth quarter of 1979 through the third quarter of 1982 
with respect to Federal Reserve policy. This period is known 
as the "Monetarist Experiment" because the Federal Reserve 
announced that it would be adopting monetarist principles in 
the implementation of its policy. Supporters of monetarism 
claim that this was not a true monetarist experiment because 
the Federal Reserve implemented policy incorrectly. 
Using statistical and time-series regression analyses, I 
address this question and conclude that the "Monetarist 
Experiment" was nothing of the kind. Federal Reserve policy 
never actually changed and monetary aggregates were not 
affected according to the principles of monetarism. 
Furthermore, using regression techniques, I conduct a 
simulation experiment using growth rates for the money supply 
which are more in line with monetarist philosophies. The 
resulting GNP growth rates are much smoother and steadier over 
time. Had monetarism been tried, rather than the chaotic 
money supply fluctuations that characterized the period, we 
would likely have seen an economy characterized by greater 
stability. 
v 
Chapter One 
Introduction and Review of Monetarism 
This paper will represent a discussion of Federal Reserve 
policy between 1979 and 1982. This period is referred to as 
the " Monetarist Experiment" because the Federal Reserve 
announced that they would be following monetarist ideas with 
respect to the implementation of policy. It is the purpose in 
this thesis to show that the policy was non-monetarist in its 
implementation because Federal Reserve goals were never 
altered to those of monetarists. 
In terms of the literature we will be discussing three 
major areas. The first is literature dedicated to the 
discussion of monetarism and its theoretical background. The 
second area is discussion of literature concerning opponents 
of monetarism. The third area is literature devoted to 
discussion of the "Monetarist Experiment" itself. 
What is Monetarism? 
The basic idea of monetarism is that inflation is a 
monetary phenomenon. Changes in growth rates of money have 
effects on changes in the rate of inflation. Given this basic 
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idea, monetarists maintain that only a slow and steady rate 
growth for the money supply, one which is in line with the 
real rate of growth for the economy, can insure that the price 
level will remain stable (Macesich 3). 
The leading voice in monetarist Economics is that of 
Milton Friedman. In his years as a monetarist economist, he 
has summarized the monetarist view on the relationship between 
the growth rate of money and the price level: 
1. There is a constant, though not precise, relationship 
between the rate of growth of the money supply and the rate of 
growth of nominal income. 
2. This relationship is not obvious at first mostly because 
there is a lag in the effect of a change in the growth rate of 
the money supply to a change in the growth of nominal income. 
3. On average, a change in the growth rate of money produces 
a change in the growth rate of nominal income on the order of 
two to three quarters later. This is, of course, on average 
and is subject to the individual cases. 
4. The change in income shows up first in output, and almost 
not at all in prices. 
5. On average, the effect on the price level shows up some 
two to three quarters after the initial effect on income. 
Therefore, the total delay between a change in the growth rate 
of money and a change in the price level is approximately 
twelve to eighteen months. 
6. Even after allowing for a delay in the effect of monetary 
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growth, the relationship is not perfect. There can be slips 
between the change in money and the change in income, possibly 
because of slight shifts in money demand or velocity. 
7. In the short-run, money changes affect output primarily. 
However, over the long-run, money changes affect primarily 
prices (Macesich 3-4) 
In short, monetarists believe that money and its rate of 
growth have important impacts on short-run economic phenomena 
such as inflation, output, and income. 
Monetarism is typically identified with Milton Friedman, 
and deservedly so; he has been one of the leading monetarist 
economists in America for the better part of fifty years. 
Therefore, we naturally consider him to be the leader of the 
Chicago School of Economic Thought. However, the foundations 
for monetarist theory were in place long before Friedman. 
Friedman attributes the substantive foundations for 
monetarist thought to Irving Fisher. Fisher set forth the 
idea of a quantity theory of money: that is, a relationship 
between money and prices. Obviously, the general idea that 
money and prices are related is one of the oldest in the 
history of economic thought. However, the Quantity Theory of 
Money states this idea in terms of mathematics. Fisher 
developed the quantity equation: MV=PT, money multiplied by 
the constant velocity equals prices multiplied by the volume 
of transactions. Not only did Fisher present this equation, 
he also applied it in various contexts. Fisher maintained 
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that fluctuations in economic activity were reflections of 
changes in the quantity of money (Milton Friedman, Monetary 
Economics 3). 
In his book Appreciation and Interest (1876) Fisher 
analyzed the relationship between interest rates and 
inflation.2 This relationship calls into question the 
difference between nominal and real rates of interest. His 
example is as follows: if you lend someone one-hundred pounds 
today and in one year's time you receive one-hundred six 
pounds, and in the meantime the price level rises by six 
percent then your one-hundred six pounds will be worth one-
hundred pounds today. The nominal rate of interest is six 
percent but the real rate is zero. Fisher also distinguished 
between actual interest real rates, realized after the event, 
and the anticipated real interest rate that lenders and 
borrowers expect. This distinction is very important in 
understanding the relationship between inflation and real 
rates of interest. If the expected rate of inflation is less 
that six percent, then a lender might be willing to lend at 
six percent because his anticipated real interest rate would 
be greater than zero. Similarly, if the expected rate of 
inflation is greater than six percent, that same lender would 
not be willing to lend at six percent because his anticipated 
real interest rate would be less than zero. This distinction 
between actual real rates and anticipated real rates helps to 
explain why inflation tends to linger once it has begun. As 
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inflation accelerates, people come to expect it and build this 
expected inflation into the interest rates they are willing to 
pay or demand (Milton Friedman, Monetary Economics 3-4). 
Now that we see that there is a relationship between 
money and income and, furthermore, between money and 
inflation, we must now discuss monetarism with respect to 
policy implementation. What can public policy makers, both 
monetary and fiscal, learn from the study of monetarist 
Economics? 
First, let us discuss monetary policy as a tool. 
Monetarism is associated with the idea that monetary policy is 
the most effective tool at the disposal of the Federal 
Government. Monetary policy dominates fiscal policy in terms 
of affecting the economy (Olsen 462). In its most general 
sense, the credo of the monetarists is that monetary policy is 
much more effective in influencing aggregate demand and output 
than is fiscal policy (Harris 429). 
We now have one-half of the monetarist suggestion for 
policy implementation. Money matters and is relatively more 
important than fiscal policy; we must affect changes in the 
money supply. The second question is "how?" There are a 
number of ways to affect the supply of money. We can use the 
yo-yo approach and bounce the growth rate of money up or down 
as we see short-run changes in the economy (which has often 
been typical of the Federal Reserve approach) or we can take 
a different approach. 
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Milton Friedman proposes that money matters and that 
monetary policy dominates fiscal policy. However, Friedman 
has proposed how our policy may be implemented. Instead of 
the discretionary policy which the Federal Reserve uses, 
Friedman suggest choosing an appropriate rate of growth for 
the money supply and adhering to it. With a steady rate of 
growth of money we would see a steady growth in income, 
output, and, eventually, inflation. This is not to say that 
we could perfectly predict income based on the growth of 
money; however, with steady growth of money, inflation would 
eventually become steady and, therefore, inflation 
expectations would be steady as well (Milton Friedman, Program 
99-100). Given what was set forth by Irving Fisher concerning 
the relationship between expected inflation and realized 
inflation (Milton Friedman, Monetary Economics 3-4) , 
eliminating some uncertainty in expectations would lead to a 
more stable economy, other things constant. 
Monetarism vs. Non-Monetarism 
There has always been a considerable debate over what 
determines the levels and growth rates of nominal GNP, prices, 
and unemployment. Macroeconomics is concerned with these 
variables and how we may use stabilization policy to make them 
move in desirable directions. There are three major 
categories of stabilization policy: 
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1. Monetary policy - using changes in the money supply 
and interest rates 
2. Fiscal policy - using changes in government spending 
and taxation 
3. A miscellaneous category of government policy 
including wage-price controls or incomes policies. 
The particular policy which one favors is related to which 
underlying theory one prefers (Miller and Pulsinelli, 
Macroeconomics 16-17). 
Let us first discuss the "Keynesian Revolution" in 
Economic thought. This revolution is identified with John 
Maynard Keynes and his 19 3 6 book The General Theory of 
Employment. Interest, and Money. In this book, Keynes 
criticizes earlier economic thinking (the classical model) on 
empirical and theoretical grounds (Miller and Pulsinelli, 
Macroeconomics 128). 
The most basic criticism of monetary policy by the 
Keynesians has to do with the stability of money demand (or 
velocity). Classical economists (and monetarists) maintain 
that the demand for money is relatively stable, meaning that 
monetary policy will have a constant effect on the quantity of 
money that is demanded. However, Keynesians believe that 
money demand is unstable and therefore monetary policy is 
relatively ineffective, especially in periods of recession or 
depression because profit expectations are already depressed 
to the point where nominal interest rates are not affected by 
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a change in the money supply (Keynes 3 04-06) . Keynes 
maintains that monetary policy is ineffective because in his 
demand for money function there is a flat portion of the 
curve. What this money demand function says is that there may 
be an interest rate that is low enough to cause people to hold 
a limitless amount of money, and financial institutions are 
prepared to sell bonds and hold excess reserves (Miller and 
Pulsinelli, Macroeconomics 511-15). Essentially, Keynesians 
believe that, in a recessionary period, monetary policy cannot 
even affect nominal interest rates, let alone GNP growth rates 
or inflation, because of the perverse movements of money 
demand or velocity. 
Because the demand for money is not stable, we may be 
faced with an unstable economy, contrary to what the classical 
economists believe. Given our unstable economy, stabilization 
policy must be used in order to correct the instability in the 
economy. Because, according to Keynesians, monetary policy is 
ineffective in terms of changing the economy during 
recessionary times, fiscal policy is the method by which 
stabilization can occur. Fiscal policy must be used whenever 
aggregate demand is insufficient to absorb the current level 
of GNP (Morgan 68).3 
An important idea of the Keynesian model is the concept 
of price/wage and interest rate inflexibility (the liquidity 
trap). New Keynesians reject this idea of price and interest 
rate instability. Instead of agreeing with Keynes that 
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unemployment can exist at equilibrium positions, New 
Keynesians refer to unemployment as a disequilibrium problem. 
Unemployment is not a result of the rigidity of prices and 
wages, but it exists because prices do not adjust 
instantaneously to their equilibrium values because of 
imperfect information (Harris 280). 
With respect to policy, the New Keynesians differ from 
Keynesians in that they find discretionary monetary policy, in 
conjunction with appropriate fiscal policy, to be desirable.4 
Fiscal policy is important to New Keynesians for the same 
reason it is important to Keynesians — to absorb current GNP 
levels which cannot be absorbed by aggregate demand. However, 
according to New Keynesians, monetary policy does have an 
indirect effect on the price level through its effect on money 
wages, and New Keynesians seek to use monetary policy to 
exploit the relationship of the Phillips curve (Rousseas 77). 
For these reasons, New Keynesians favor fiscal policy and 
discretionary monetary policy in order to "fine-tune" the 
economy. 
The third non-monetarist school of thought consists of 
those who favor the Rational Expectations Hypothesis. In 
short, this theory says that because expectations are 
rational, errors made in one period have no effect on errors 
made in subsequent periods (Miller and Pulsinelli, 
Macroeconomics 8). 
With respect to policy, the theory simply states that no 
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stabilization policy can affect systematic changes in output 
and employment even in the short-run. Because the errors 
concerning inflation that people make are not correlated with 
previous errors, the difference between expected inflation and 
actual inflation is random. Because these errors are random, 
they cannot be affected in a systematic way and certainly 
long-run unemployment and output will return to natural rates 
(Harris 459). 
Even though expectations are rational, the Federal 
Reserve can attempt to "fool" people with respect to policy. 
If a change in policy (or a supply/demand shock) is 
anticipated or announced then the economy remains at its 
natural level of output (Miller and Pulsinelli, Macroeconomics 
406) . However, the Federal Reserve can choose not to announce 
a plan to increase (or decrease) the growth rate of the money 
supply. Given this, there exists imperfect information 
concerning policy. In the short-run, there can be some 
unpredictable effect, but economic agents will already have 
guessed a change in Federal Reserve policy and will have 
incorporated inflation into their expectations (assuming 
Federal Reserve policy is expansionary) and output and 
unemployment will be unaffected. Because some economic agents 
will have overestimated and some will have underestimated 
inflation the Federal Reserve cannot affect output or 
employment in a systematic way (Miller and Pulsinelli, 
Macroeconomics 407). In terms of policy implications, the 
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Rational Expectationalists are not particularly far removed 
from the monetarists. The only difference between the two in 
terms of stabilization policy is that monetarists specify the 
growth rate of the money supply to be approximately equal to 
the natural growth rate for the economy. Rational 
Expectationalists see that as a non-issue because, regardless 
of the actions of the Federal Reserve, unemployment and output 
will return to natural rates.5 
Now that we have established what monetarism is and what 
its major opponents in the arena of macroeconomics are, we 
must attempt to settle the debate over monetary vs. fiscal 
policy using empirical data applied to economic theory. The 
most well known and studied of these models is the Anderson-
Jordan equation otherwise known as the St. Louis equation. 
Revisiting Anderson-Jordan 
The St. Louis equation was developed by two men, Leonall 
Anderson and Jerry Jordan, while they were working in the 
research department at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(hence the St. Louis equation). This equation is among the 
most important and influential econometric models in modern 
economic thought and has elicited numerous articles and 
criticisms over the last twenty plus years. 
Let us start by discussing what the Anderson-Jordan model 
(hereafter referred to as A-J) is and what it implies. The 
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equation is as follows: 
1 ) D Y i = a 0 + s u m B i D m i - i + s u m G i D e i - i + u i 
where y, m, and e denote nominal GNP, the money stock (Ml), 
and nominal high-employment government expenditures, 
respectively, and u denotes the usual random disturbance term. 
It can be written more compactly as: 
2) Dy, = a0 + B (L) Dm1 + G (L) De1 + u,, 
where B(L) and G(L) are polynomial distributed lags of order 
k. Anderson and Jordan choose k=3. This lag structure means 
that, in this model, the effects of monetary and fiscal policy 
are constrained to lie on a polynomial of order three. What 
this equation says is that changes in nominal GNP are a 
function of changes in the Ml money supply and changes in 
government spending (Batten and Thornton 10). 
The empirical results of A-J favored the monetarist 
ideas. The coefficients on Ml were positive and significant 
while the coefficients on government expenditures were 
insignificant at the five percent level of significance 
(Batten and Thornton 12) . Though there have been a number of 
econometric criticisms of the A-J model, its structure is 
still the blueprint for further econometric research in the 
area of monetary vs. fiscal policy.6 
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Given the Anderson-Jordan equation and its results, it 
would appear that, in terms of policy implementation, monetary 
policy, in our model, dominates fiscal policy with regards to 
affecting nominal income. These results might seem to put to 
rest the ongoing debate. However, monetarism is not only that 
money matters; we must also correctly target the money supply 
and reach stable growth rates for that money. The next 
question in our discussion of monetarism is whether or not it 
can work in practice. 
The Monetarist Experiment 
The Federal Reserve, between 1970 and 1979, was 
attempting to control the money supply through the use of the 
Federal Funds rate. This period marks the beginning of the 
"modern" era of Federal Reserve policy. The Federal Reserve 
chose a firm intermediate target for money supply growth and 
attempted to reach that target through the use of Federal 
Funds rate targeting. The Federal Reserve was required to 
forecast the position of the money demand schedule and deduce 
what long term interest rate would be needed in order to meet 
its intermediate target. The problem that the Federal Reserve 
encountered was shifting money demand. The forecasts for the 
money demand schedule were inaccurate and that caused the 
Federal Reserve to miss its intermediate target growth rate 
for the money supply. Eventually, the money stock began 
14 
growing faster than what was consistent with intermediate 
targets. By 1979, the money stock and inflation had 
accelerated. This prompted the Federal Reserve to announce a 
different strategy for policy implementation. The Federal 
Reserve would begin targeting non-borrowed reserves directly 
(Miller and VanHoose 669-73). 
This change in policy marks the beginning of the 
"Monetarist Experiment." This "Monetarist Experiment" lasted 
through the third quarter of 1982, exactly three years. 
Opponents of monetarism use the instability of the economy 
during this period as a severe criticism of monetarism (Olsen 
463-64). 
Milton Friedman indicts Federal Reserve policy by 
mentioning that during the experiment, the Federal Reserve 
reverted to its old policy. Despite its announcement to 
change policy and target monetary aggregates, the Federal 
Reserve began targeting the straight Federal Funds rate during 
a brief period of time in the spring of 1980 ("Monetary 
Policy" 109). 
Along with Milton Friedman, many other monetarists 
criticize the Federal Reserve's policy during this period. 
The instability of the growth rates of monetary aggregates 
leads these critics of the Federal Reserve to conclude that 
the Federal Reserve never really abandoned its commitment to 
interest rate control. If this is the case, the Federal 
Reserve, despite its policy announcement, must forego control 
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of monetary aggregates (Miller and Pulsinelli, Modern Money 
and Banking 522).8 
Critics of the Federal Reserve's policy during the 
"Monetarist Experiment" were not restricted to the private 
sector. Before the end of the experiment, Larry Roos, the 
president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve, made several 
speeches complaining that the Open Market Committee was not 
being faithful to the monetarist doctrine (Greider 390). This 
criticism of Federal Reserve policy during the experiment is 
particularly damaging because it was levied from within the 
Federal Reserve itself. 
Also, during the experiment, when the Federal Reserve 
claimed to target the growth of the money supply, the discount 
rate was also being targeted. The Federal Reserve would have 
a difficult time maintaining control of the money supply if 
the discount rate (and later the Federal Funds rate) is also 
targeted (Greider 216-18). 
Furthermore, during 1980, the first full year of the 
experiment, "money supply growth rose and fell like a yo-
yo. "(Greider 218) The money supply was up 13% in February, 
down 17% in April, up nearly 23% in August, and down 17% in 
December. This pattern can be seen in interest rates as well. 
Granted, during this experiment we see the Federal Reserve's 
impact on the economy being as bizarre as the jumping interest 
rates and money supply growth rates. This period showed short 
gyrations from recession to recovery and back again (Greider 
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218-19). The volatility of the money supply growth rates are 
yet another indication of the Federal Reserve's failure to 
correctly implement monetarism. 
Some Economists, however, do believe that the Federal 
Reserve acted in good faith and began to target non-borrowed 
reserves. Michael Bradley and Dennis Jansen specify vector 
auto-regressive models for the period before and during the 
"Monetarist Experiment." They estimate these models in order 
to determine whether there were different patterns of 
influence among monetary variables in the two periods. Their 
findings favor the idea that the Federal Reserve had begun 
targeting non-borrowed reserves because they note marked 
differences between the two periods with regards to the 
influences of monetary policy variables. Non-borrowed 
reserves, during the experiment, no longer varied with 
interest rates. In the views of Bradley and Jansen, the 
Federal Reserve had changed policy (328-34). Furthermore, 
during the "Monetarist Experiment" the variability of the 
Federal Funds rate increased to nearly twenty times what it 
was between 1970 and 1979. These two observations tend to 
support the idea that the Federal Reserve was no longer 
targeting the Federal Funds rate (Miller and VanHoose 678). 
We see that the Federal Reserve may have abandoned its 
commitment to interest rates and began targeting non-borrowed 
reserves. However, the Federal Reserve did not achieve their 
targets for monetary aggregates. Many non-monetarists suggest 
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that the Federal Reserve is simply unable to accurately target 
the growth rate of the money supply. These non-monetarists 
maintain that non policy supply and demand-side factors make 
attaining targeted money supply growth rates very difficult 
(Bryant 6-7). Because the Federal Reserve cannot explicitly 
control the growth rate of the money supply, widening the 
target range for the Federal Funds rate not only makes the 
Federal Funds rate unstable, but makes the money supply growth 
rate unstable as well (Mishkin 392-4) . This type of criticism 
calls into question the practicality of monetarism as a guide 
for policy. If the Federal Reserve cannot explicitly control 
the growth rate of the money supply, then a fixed-rate rule 
for monetary policy is not achievable. 
During a meeting of the American Economic Association in 
December of 1983, Benjamin Friedman attacks the "Monetarist 
Experiment" by citing numerous inconsistencies in economic 
behavior with respect to the implementation of monetarist 
principles in Federal Reserve policy. First of all, he shows 
that the monetary aggregates Ml, M2, and M3 did not move 
together over the period between 1979 and 1982. Between the 
fourth quarter of 1979 and the fourth quarter of 1980, the Ml 
growth rate moved from 7.4% to 7.2% while M2 and M3 growth 
rates went from 8.1% to 9.0% and 9.6% to 9.7% respectively 
during this period. From 1980 to 1981, the Ml growth rate 
dropped from 7.2% to 5.1% while M2 rose to 9.4% and M3 was up 
to 11.7%. In 1982, the Ml growth rate rose to 8.5% while the 
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M2 and M3 rates rose to 9.3% and 10.1% respectively. 
According to the monetarist ideal, these aggregates should 
move roughly in tandem. Also, the movement of some monetary 
aggregate should roughly explain the movement of the growth 
rate of nominal GNP. Friedman shows that the nominal GNP 
growth rate went from 9.7% in 1979 to 9.3% in 1980 and to 
10.8% in 1981. These were years in which the growth rate of 
Ml declined from 7.4% in 1979 to 5.1% in 1981. Also, in 1982, 
the growth rate of GNP was 2.6% while the Ml growth rate was 
at 8.5%. These observations seem to be inconsistent with the 
principles of monetarism (Benjamin Friedman 382-84). 
These inconsistencies in GNP growth rates with respect to 
monetary growth rates seem to add credibility to the idea that 
monetarism did not work when the Federal Reserve used it as a 
guide for policy implementation. 
The obvious champion to whom I shall look for a rebuttle 
of Benjamin Friedman's criticisms is, of course, Milton 
Friedman. Milton Friedman introduced a paper at the same 
conference as Benjamin Friedman. In this paper, Friedman 
responds to the critics of monetarism. 
With regard to the different movements in monetary 
aggregates, Friedman cites the confusion of labels. The 
aggregates, how they are currently defined, do not correspond 
to those aggregates about which the claims by monetarists were 
made. The current M2 is much broader than the earlier M2. It 
is almost identical to the M4 aggregate compiled earlier by 
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Friedman and Schwartz7. The Ml measure is closer, 
conceptually to the earlier M2 because it includes interest 
bearing deposits. Monetarists never recommended the use of 
such broad aggregates as M2 and M3 as monetary targets. The 
closest approximations to those aggregates recommended are Ml 
and the monetary base (Milton Friedman, "Lessons" 398). 
On the question of movements in GNP growth with respect 
to changes in a monetary aggregate growth, Friedman says that 
a year is too long a time unit to use, especially between the 
years 1980 through 1983 which were characterized by abnormally 
short cyclical phases in the economy. Monetarists attribute 
these short cyclical phases to short and volatile gyrations in 
monetary growth during this period of time. Also, monetarists 
have concluded that nominal GNP growth lags behind Ml growth 
some six months, on average. Friedman cites swings in Ml and 
nominal GNP one quarter later from 1978:4 to 1979:4 for Ml and 
1979:1 to 1980:1 for nominal GNP. Fluctuations in the two 
measures move up and identically (although not in magnitude or 
measure) in direction when the data is lagged one quarter 
(Milton Friedman, "Lessons" 3 99) . 
Milton Friedman takes one more stab at the anti-
monetarist. Although the opponents of monetarism refer to the 
Federal Reserve policy during this time period as monetarist, 
Friedman maintains that it was decidedly non-monetarist in its 
implementation. The Federal Reserve claimed to target 
monetary aggregates, but that is only part of a monetarist 
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policy. In addition to targeting explicitly monetary 
aggregates, the achievement of a steady and predictable rate 
of growth in the aggregate is essential as well. On this 
point, the Federal Reserve was decidedly anti-monetarist. 
Friedman shows the simple standard deviation of quarter to 
quarter monetary growth rates prior to October 1979 (1.59%) 
and after October 1979 (5.64%). The volatility of monetary 
growth was higher in the three years of the experiment than it 
was in any earlier three year period since World War II. This 
volatility serves as a particularly strong refutation of anti-
monetarist claims that the Federal Reserve tried monetarism 
and it did not work. The Federal Reserve, in fact, did not 
use a monetarist policy during the period of 1979 through 1982 
(Milton Friedman, "Lessons" 399). 
In his article "Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice" 
(1982), Friedman refers to Federal Reserve policy as a 
function of "bureaucratic inertia." This is not in reference 
only to the period of the experiment, but throughout the 
history of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve fails to 
correct mistakes despite its widespread recognition because 
the Federal Reserve has no bottom line. The Federal Reserve 
has no budget constraint, it faces no voters, and once its 
board members are appointed to a full term, they cannot be 
reappointed. In contrast, the private sector has a bottom 
line, monetary losses. If this occurs, employees get fired or 
demoted. In government, this occurs to a smaller extent in 
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that officials are subject to voter disenchantment (114). 
This lack of a bottom line is why the Federal Reserve is able 
to make mistakes in policy and can continue to make those same 
mistakes, like the failure during the experiment, without 
retribution. 
From a political standpoint, it is very difficult to 
implement a change in policy which is designed to reduce 
inflation. There was a desire to quell inflationary trends 
but at the same time avoid policies which might lead to 
recession. The Federal Reserve's policy of targeting bank 
reserves is referred to as "monetarist." However, the 
political desires to avoid any recessionary trend made for an 
environment which was hardly conducive to the monetarist 
fixed-growth rule (Olsen 468) . 
Critics of monetarism named the Federal Reserve policy of 
1979-82 the "Monetarist Experiment." These critics maintain, 
however, that it could never be monetarist enough to satisfy 
the purists of the monetarist community (Olsen 468). This 
particular criticism of monetarism is unfounded because there 
is no gray area in monetarist theory. The monetarist theory 
is very specific in terms of suggestions for policy. The 
simple fact that money supply growth rates were extremely 
volatile during the experiment gives rise to suspicion that 
the Federal Reserve did not implement monetarism. Critics of 
monetarism, while trying to emphasize the Federal Reserves 
inability to control non-borrowed reserves, unwittingly give 
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strength to the argument that Federal Reserve policy was not 
monetarist by highlighting volatile money supply growth during 
the period. It must be emphasized that volatile money supply 
growth rates and a Federal Reserve policy which is monetarist 
are mutually exclusive events. 
Overview of Thesis 
Given that there has been considerable debate over the 
reference to this period of time as a monetarist experiment, 
there is sufficient evidence given by monetarists to examine 
this period of time and determine if it was an experiment in 
monetarism. It has been suggested that there is, at least, 
reasonable doubt that the Federal Reserve abandoned its 
previous policy of targeting interest rates and began to 
target monetary aggregates. However, whether or not the 
Federal Reserve abandoned its commitment to interest rates is 
not as important as the ultimate goal of policy. 
As we shall see, not only is there some doubt that the 
Federal Reserve changed the intermediate target of its policy, 
but there is some doubt as to whether or not the Federal 
Reserve changed the goal of its policy. In the next chapter, 
we will look at the "Monetarist Experiment" from an empirical 
point of view. We will discuss the issue of changes in 
Federal Reserve policy and also examine the true goals of 
Federal Reserve policy. 
Chapter Two 
An Empirical Look at the 
Monetarist Experiment 
Because of the instability in the economy during the 
period of the "Monetarist Experiment," anti-monetarists have 
hailed the period as a failure of monetarism, while 
monetarists have maintained that the principles of monetarism 
were never implemented by the Federal Reserve with regards to 
policy. In the first chapter, we saw that there are 
compelling arguments on either side of the issue. In this 
chapter, we will begin to explore this issue from a purely 
empirical standpoint. 
Was it Monetarism? 
As we have discussed in the first chapter, there are two 
major components of a monetarist policy. First, the growth 
rate of the money supply should be the intermediate target of 
macro-economic policy. Instead of trying to affect changes in 
the economy by using fiscal policy, the Federal Government 
should use monetary policy. Second, not only is it important 
to target monetary aggregates, but it is also imperative that 
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these aggregates grow in a steady fashion, one which is in 
line with the natural growth of the economy. Furthermore, 
monetarism is concerned with long term macroeconomic goals 
such as stable inflation or increased GNP growth. In order to 
implement monetarism, the Federal Reserve must have a clear 
macroeconomic goal, that is, stabilized inflation. A 
monetarist policy requires this goal; therefore, the actual 
intermediate target is unimportant since the Federal Reserves 
tool (monetary policy) never changes. In other words, the 
Federal Reserve targets the money supply whether directly, 
through non-borrowed reserve targeting, or indirectly, through 
Federal Funds rate targeting (Wallich 23). 
Now that we have established the criteria for identifying 
a monetarist policy, we can look simply at the numbers from 
this period and draw our own conclusions. Was it a failure of 
monetarism, or merely a failure of policy? 
Initially, let us assume that, consistent with its 
announcement, the Federal Reserve began targeting monetary 
aggregates in order to stabilize inflation in the fourth 
quarter of 1979. Given this assumption (which we will see can 
be questioned), the Federal Reserve needs only to insure slow, 
steady growth in the money supply in order to meet monetarist 
criteria. Let us look at the numbers. 
First, we need to determine which monetary aggregate we 
are going to use for our empirical test. We chose the Ml 
monetary aggregate for two reasons: 1) the Federal Reserve has 
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more control over that aggregate than over more comprehensive 
aggregates like M2 or M3 because Ml is influenced to a greater 
extent by the monetary base and, 2) Anderson and Jordan used 
the Ml aggregate in their St. Louis equation9. 
Now that we have our monetary aggregate, let us look at 
the descriptive statistics of the growth rate of Ml in the 
period between the fourth quarter of 1976 and the third 
quarter of 1979 (the three years just before the experiment) . 
The sample mean of this series is .0207046 in decimal form and 
the sample standard deviation of this series is .0067743. Now 
we can compare those numbers with the descriptive statistics 
of this series during the experiment. Between the fourth 
quarter of 1979 and the third quarter of 1982, we find that 
the mean changed some (it was .0151898) but the standard 
deviation grew from .0067743 to .0162607 (see Tables 2.1 and 
2.2 for statistical output)10. There is enough evidence in 
just these sample descriptive statistics to warrant further 
study. The fact that the standard deviation is 2.4 times as 
large during the experiment gives us some idea that monetary 
growth rates became unstable during this period. 
This point is shown graphically in Figure 2.1. Figure 
2.1 shows quarterly growth rates for the Ml aggregate from 
1962 through the third quarter of 1982. The graphical 
representation shows visually the instability of the series 
over the time period of the experiment (1979.4 through 
1982.3). As we can see, growth rates were not particularly 
Table 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics for 
the Growth Rate of Ml 
Sample Range 1976.4 through 1979.3 
Number of Observations - 12 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Max Min 
DM1 .0207046 .0067743 .0344314 .007735 
Table 2.2 
Sample Range 1979.4 through 1982.3 
Number of Observations - 12 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Max Min 
DM1 .0151898 .0162607 .0565691 -.0028413 
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stable in the years before the experiment. If this had been 
a truly monetarist experiment, we would expect to see a series 
that is more, not less, stable. 
In addition to simple visual investigation of the 
standard deviations for the Ml growth rate series, it is 
necessary that we conduct a statistical test on the variances 
of the two time periods in question. Our test is an F-test on 
the ratio of variances. We set our null hypothesis to be that 
the true variance of the series DMl over the experiment period 
is less than or equal to the variance of the series DMl over 
the three years before the experiment. Our test statistic is 
5.7616865 and our critical value is 2.82 (Gujarati 682). 
Because our test statistic is greater than our critical value, 
we must reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the 
variance of our series DMl is higher over the period of the 
experiment (1979.4 through 1982.3) than it was over the three 
years prior to the experiment.11 
Given this evidence, we must conclude that the Federal 
Reserve did not strive for a stable rate of monetary growth. 
Therefore, this experiment was decidedly non-monetarist in its 
implementation, and we cannot conclude that it is a failure of 
monetarism. 
Was Policy Really Changed? 
Now that we have concluded that the experiment conducted 
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between the fourth quarter of 1979 and the third quarter of 
1982 was not a monetarist experiment, we must now challenge an 
assumption made earlier in this chapter — that the Federal 
Reserve changed its ultimate goal. In essence, we must 
examine the idea that the Federal Reserve changed policy and 
began to target non-borrowed reserves in order to stabilize 
inflation. 
Prior to the experiment, the Federal Reserve used 
discretionary monetary policy as a means to an end. The 
Federal Reserve used policy that was designed to exploit the 
Phillips curve and target the unemployment rate with the rate 
of inflation being a secondary issue. The Federal Reserve 
supposedly changed its policy and began targeting monetary 
aggregates in order to stabilize inflation, making the 
unemployment rate a secondary issue. In order to test this 
proposition, we must determine a relationship between monetary 
growth and the civilian unemployment rate. The Federal 
Reserve, except during the experiment, would try to use 
monetary policy to try to control unemployment. It is at this 
point that our money reaction function begins. 
A money reaction function is a model that is designed to 
demonstrate the reaction of monetary policy to changes in some 
other macroeconomic phenomenon. In this model we will examine 
the reaction of monetary policy to changes in the civilian 
unemployment rate (see Figure 2.2). However, during the time 
period of the experiment, we would not expect to see 
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changes in the civilian unemployment rate to have any effect 
on the growth of money because, according to the Federal 
Reserve, inflation control via influence over monetary 
aggregates was its main objective. Our reaction function is 
as follows: 
DMlt = a0 + a1DMlt.1 + a2URATEt ., + a3UD + a4UD2 + ut 
where DMl is the growth rate of the Ml money aggregate, URATE 
is the civilian unemployment rate (%) , UD is the civilian 
unemployment rate lagged one quarter multiplied by a dummy 
variable which equals one in quarters 1979.4 through 1982.3, 
and zero in all other periods; and UD2 is the civilian 
unemployment rate lagged one quarter multiplied by a dummy 
variable which equals one in quarters 1982.4 through 1988.4, 
and zero in all periods before and during the experiment. 
This equation says that the growth rate of Ml in period t is 
influenced by the growth rate of Ml in period t-1, the 
civilian unemployment rate in period t-1, and our interactive 
terms. 
The important parts of this money reaction function are 
the interactive terms — the dummy variables multiplied by the 
lagged unemployment rate. Because we have specified the 
variables as we have, we should expect to see the first 
interactive term (UD) have a significantly negative 
coefficient if the Federal Reserve changed policy during the 
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experiment. Similarly, we should see the second interactive 
term have a significant positive coefficient if policy was 
changed during the experiment and then changed back after the 
experiment. The significance of these terms would imply that 
the unemployment rate became less important to the Federal 
Reserve during the experiment. If policy was not changed, the 
first interactive (UD) term would be insignificant because the 
effect of a lagged value of the unemployment rate was not 
altered during the experiment period. Similarly, if the 
second interactive term (UD2) is insignificant, then policy 
after the experiment, with regards to unemployment, would not 
have been changed. 
Because the Federal Reserve claimed to change policy, we 
would expect that our money reaction function will show this 
change in policy. However, that is not the case. The 
coefficients on the lagged unemployment rate terms and the 
lagged Ml growth rate term are significant at the five percent 
level. The coefficients on our interactive terms, however, 
are not significant even at the 69 and 29 percent levels, 
respectively (see Table 2.5 for the output for this regression 
and Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on Ml growth rate 
stationarity). These insignificant values indicate that no 
detectable change took place in the relationship between 
lagged unemployment and monetary policy during the experiment 
nor after the experiment. These findings force us to 
seriously reconsider the claims by the Federal Reserve 
Table 2.5 
Money Reaction Function Equation 
Sample Range 1962.1 through 1988.4 
Number of Observations - 108 
Dependent Variable - DMl 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat 2-Tail Sicf. 
C 
DMl (-1) 
URATE (-1) 
UD 
UD2 
0010376 
2137285 
0018910 
0001733 
0003868 
0035741 
0946701 
0006120 
0004418 
0003707 
.2903164 
2 . 2576137 
3 . 0899200 
-.3923018 
1. 0433198 
.7722 
. 0261 
. 0026 
. 6956 
.2992 
R 
Adj . R2 
Regression S.E. 
Log Likelihood 
Durbin-Watson 
.181253 Mean of Dep. Variable .015688 
.149457 S.D. of Dep. Variable .010348 
.009543 Sum of Squared Residuals .009380 
351.7234 F-Statistic 5.700515 
1.970805 Prob(F-Statistic) .000348 
Stationarity Test for 
the Growth Rate of Ml 
Sample Range 1962.1 through 1988.4 
Number of Observations - 108 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller: UROOT(C,0) DMl 
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic -7.4627 
MacKinnon critical values: 1% -3.4917 
5% -2.8882 
10% -2.5808 
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concerning the objectives of monetary policy during the 
experiment. Not only were monetary aggregates not stabilized 
during this period, we also have found that policy goals were 
never changed. 
The Federal Reserve was still seeking solutions to short-
run macroeconomic problems. Instead of allowing the economy 
to proceed with only steady monetary growth, the Federal 
Reserve persisted in discretionary, reactionary monetary 
policy. We must conclude that the period referred to as the 
"Monetarist Experiment" was nothing more than the Federal 
Reserve continuing policy as before and that it never 
resembled true monetarism. 
Chapter Three 
Modelling a Monetarist Experiment 
Constructing a Proper Model 
In the past two chapters, we have discussed the Federal 
Reserve "Monetarist Experiment" and have concluded, based on 
empirical results, that it was not monetarism in any usual 
sense of the term. In fact, we have shown that the objectives 
of Federal Reserve policy never changed during the period in 
question. The next step is to conduct a "what if?" monetarist 
experiment and simulate nominal GNP growth rates over the 
period of the fourth quarter of 1979 through the third quarter 
of 1982. 
In order to begin our experiment, we must construct an 
econometric model which adequately explains GNP growth in 
terms of monetary growth. As we have seen, the Anderson-
Jordan equation is the bench-mark model for this relationship 
and will be the basis for building a model for our experiment. 
First, we must list all variables which will be used in 
our model building and subsequent simulation experiment. They 
are as follows: 
Ml - The Ml money stock in billions of dollars (SAAR) 
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GOVEX - Federal Government expenditures in billions of 
dollars (SAAR) 
Y - Gross National Product, total, in billions of 
dollars (SAAR) 
DM1 - Growth rate of the Ml money stock 
DGOV - Growth rate of Federal Government Expenditures 
DGNP - Growth rate of nominal Gross National Product 
Each variable is quarterly data from the first quarter of 1961 
through the fourth quarter of 198812. 
For our estimation of a regression equation, I have 
chosen DGNP, DM1, and DGOV. DM1 is a proxy for monetary 
policy by the Federal Reserve and DGOV is a proxy for fiscal 
policy by the Federal Government. 
Our theoretical relationship is that GNP growth should be 
a function of money supply growth and government expenditure 
growth. A linear regression equation will look similar to 
this: 
DGNPt = a0 + a1DMlt.2 + a2DGOVt_2 + ut 
where DGNP is our growth rate of GNP, DM1 is the growth rate 
of the Ml money stock, DGOV is the growth rate of Federal 
Government expenditures, and u is the usual random disturbance 
term. It must be noticed that both explanatory variables are 
lagged two quarters, considered consistent with monetarist 
economic theory. In chapter one, we discussed the monetarist 
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view as set forth by Milton Friedman13. In his view, there is 
a lagged effect of six months between a change in money supply 
growth and a change in nominal GNP growth. We specify our 
econometric model in this fashion in order to assure that it 
is well-grounded in economic theory. 
In order to use variables in a time-series model such as 
this, it is necessary that the individual series be stationary 
(mean reverting) over time. The best way to test the 
stationarity of a time series is by using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test. Micro-TSP does this test automatically 
and produces the outputs. 
Let us look first at the series DGNP- As we can see, our 
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic is -6.865 — sufficiently large (in 
absolute value) to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
(non-stationarity); therefore, we conclude that the series is 
stationary over our sample period (1962.1 through 1979.3). 
The same is true for the series DMl and DGOV. The Dickey-
Fuller t-statistics are -5.4521 and -8.2957, respectively, 
both of which are large enough (in absolute value) to reject 
the null hypothesis of a unit root at the five percent level 
of significance (see output for DMl, DGOV and DGNP in Table 
3.1). 
Now that we have our functional relationship and our 
variables, we estimate a linear regression equation. We 
initially estimate an equation with a number of different lags 
for each explanatory variable. The only significant 
Table 3.1 
Stationarity Test for 
the Growth Rates of GNP, Ml 
and Federal Government Expenditures 
Sample Period 1962.1 through 1979.3 
Number of Observations - 71 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller: UROOT(C,0) DGNP 
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic -6.8650 
MacKinnon critical values: 1% -3.5239 
5% -2.9023 
10% -2.5882 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller: UROOT(C,0) DM1 
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic -5.4521 
1% -3.5239 
5% -2.9023 
10% -2.5882 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller: UROOT(C,0) DGOV 
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic -8.2957 
1% -3.5239 
5% -2.9023 
10% -2.5882 
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coefficient is that on the second lag of the Ml growth rate 
(DMl(-2)). This finding is consistent with theory, since the 
effect of a change in money is shown to have a six month (two 
quarter) lagged effect (see Table 3.2 for the regression 
output). 
Because we find that the coefficients on all of the 
government expenditure variables are insignificant at the five 
percent level, we must test for exclusion restrictions. More 
specifically, in this model, we must test to see if all the 
coefficients on government expenditure are jointly equal to 
zero. To do so, we first obtain the sum of squared residuals 
from our initial regression (.004570). Then we run a 
restricted regression (one which leaves out the variables on 
government expenditures) and obtain the sum of squared 
residuals from that regression (see Table 3.3 for the output 
of this regression). The value we obtain is .004916. If the 
coefficients on the government expenditure variables are 
jointly equal to zero, the sum of squared residuals should not 
change when we run our restricted regression. We calculate an 
F-statistic for this test which is equal to 1.6404085.14 
If this number is larger than our critical F value, we 
will reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
three government expenditure variables are jointly equal to 
zero. At the five percent significance level, we find in the 
F-table that the critical value is 2.76 (Gujarati 682). 
Because our calculated F-statistic is less than our critical 
Table 3.2 
Initial (Unrestricted) Model Estimation for 
the Growth Rate of GNP 
Sample Range 1962.1 through 1979.3 
Number of Observations - 71 
Dependent Variable - DGNP 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat 2-Tail Siq. 
C .0086173 0032219 2.6746107 . 0095 
DMl(-l) .2344976 1529078 1.5335885 . 1300 
DM1(-2) .6533872 1566585 4.1707749 . 0001 
DGOV .0803978 0516727 1.5559037 . 1246 
DGOV(-l) .0513824 0514467 .9987503 . 3216 
DGOV(-2) -.0761785 
• 
0520677 -1.4630665 . 1483 
R2 308167 Mean of Dep. Variable .021576 
Adj . R2 254949 S.D. of Dep. Variable .009714 
Regression S.E. 008385 Sum of Squared Residuals - 004570 
Log Likelihood 241.8638 F-statistic 5 . 790650 
Durbin-Watson 2. 031513 Prob(F-statistic) . 000176 
Table 3.3 
Final (Restricted) Model Estimation for 
the Growth Rate of GNP 
Sample Range 1962.1 through 1979.4 
Number of Observations - 71 
Dependent Variable - DGNP 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat. 2-Tail Siq, 
C 
DM1(-1) 
DM1(-2) 
0100249 
2740664 
6021313 
0026753 
1539737 
1567026 
3.7539609 
1.7799555 
3.8425106 
0004 
0796 
0003 
R 
Adj . R2 
Regression S.E. 
Log Likelihood 
Durbin-Watson 
.255749 Mean of Dep. Variable .021576 
.233859 S.D. of Dep. Variable .009714 
.008503 Sum of Squared Residuals .004916 
239.2712 F-statistic 11.68352 
2.091816 Prob(F-statistic) .000043 
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value, we must fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that the coefficients on DGOV, DGOV(-l), and DG0V(-2) are 
jointly equal to zero. This result leaves the restricted 
regression to serve as our final model. 
Our findings during this test are not unlike the findings 
of Anderson and Jordan. They concluded that the coefficients 
on government expenditure were not significant with respect to 
affecting GNP growth. Similarly, in our linear model, we must 
reach the same conclusion. Since no single coefficient on 
government expenditure was significant and they were all 
jointly insignificant, we must conclude that fiscal policy is 
ineffective in influencing the growth of nominal income (GNP) 
— thereby leaving us with a very simple, but effective, model 
for conducting our monetarist experiment (See Figure 3.1 for 
a graphical representation of the relationship between DGNP 
and DMl). 
Diagnostics of Our Model 
Now that we have a simple linear model with which to 
conduct our experiment, it is important that we run a series 
of diagnostic tests on this model to insure that there are no 
inherent statistical problems within the model. Since we have 
already tested the two time series variables for stationarity, 
we need not cover that again; instead, we can look at the 
model itself. 
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The first, and most obvious, test to perform is a t-test 
for the significance of the coefficients on the DM1 (-1) and 
DM1(-2) variables. From our statistical output, we find that 
the t-statistic on our DM1(-1) coefficient is 1.7799555. The 
value called 2-tailed significance gives us the significance 
level at which we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient equals zero. Since this value is .0796, we can 
reject the null hypothesis at a 7.9 percent level of 
significance. The t-statistic on our DM1(-2) coefficient is 
3.8425106. The 2-tailed significance gives us .0003, meaning 
that we can reject the null hypothesis at the .03 percent 
level of significance (Newbold and Bos 88). 
Our second diagnostic test is the F-test which tests the 
overall significance of the model. The outcome of this test 
should not be different from the t-test, and indeed it is not. 
Our F-statistic from the statistical output is 11.68352. The 
number just below the F-statistic on the regression output is 
the level of significance at which we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the model is insignificant overall. This 
number is .000043, which is far below any relevant 
significance level. Therefore we are able to reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the model is significant overall 
(Newbold and Bos 89-90). 
Since this is a time series model, we must be aware of 
the problem of first-order serial correlation or 
autocorrelation. Autocorrelation occurs when the residuals 
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from the model are not independent of one another — that is, 
that the error in one period may influence the errors in 
future periods.15 
A standard test for autocorrelation is called the Durbin-
Watson test (the Durbin-Watson statistic appears in the 
statistical output) . The null hypothesis of this test is that 
there is no autocorrelation. We have our Durbin Watson test 
statistic (2.091816), and now we need a critical value. When 
we use the Durbin-Watson table, we find that there are two 
values for each number of observations and degrees of freedom. 
If the calculated Durbin-Watson statistic is above the upper 
limit test statistic, then we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. In our case (with two degrees of freedom and 71 
observations) our Durbin-Watson lower limit is 1.554 and our 
upper limit is 1.672. Because our calculated test statistic 
is above the upper limit, we must fail to reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that there is no evidence of first-
order serial correlation in the residuals of our model 
(Newbold and Bos 100-02). 
The only diagnostic of the model itself which is left to 
examine is the R2 value.16 In our model, R2 is .255749, which 
means that only twenty-five percent of the variation in DGNP 
is explained by our regression. However, this is a simple 
regression model and it is able to explain twenty-five percent 
of the variation in the dependent variable. Considering all 
those variables that the Federal Reserve cannot control and 
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that may affect the growth of nominal GNP, this model says 
that twenty-five percent of nominal growth is a function of 
the growth rate of the money supply. 
Now that we have our model, we can begin to make our 
predictions for the time period of the experiment. With these 
predictions we can make comparisons between true monetarism 
and the policy in which the Federal Reserve actually was 
engaged. 
Results From the Simulation 
Now that we have determined our model to be adequate and 
statistically sound, we can begin to make some predictions 
with it. The first predictions we estimate are those from the 
period of the fourth quarter of 1979 through the third quarter 
of 1982. This period is, of course, the period of the Federal 
Reserve "Monetarist Experiment." Because our simulation is a 
"what if?" model, we must substitute the observed growth rates 
of the money supply with manufactured growth rates which are 
more consistent with monetarist ideas. To perform this 
simulation, we use numbers from a normally distributed random 
variable with a mean of 3.5 and a standard deviation of 
.0072842 (the standard deviation of the original series DMl 
over the period 1962.1 through 1979.3). We use this normally 
distributed variable as a proxy for those elements of the 
growth rate of the Ml money supply which cannot be explicitly 
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controlled by the Federal Reserve. We chose the mean of our 
Ml growth rate to be 3.5 percent because Milton Friedman 
specified that the growth rate should be between 3.5 and 4 
percent (Program 100), and this number seems to be in line 
with the long-term growth rate of the United States economy. 
Furthermore, a random error term (et) is included which is a 
randomly generated variable with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation equal to that of the series DGNP over the sample set 
(.009714). This error term serves as a proxy for endogenous 
determinates of the growth rate of GNP which are not under the 
control of the Federal Reserve. 
Now that we have our simulated values for the growth rate 
of Ml and our error term, we can substitute them into the 
regression equation which is written as 
DGNPt = .0127125 + .2740664 (DMlt.1) + . 6021313 (DMlt.2) + et 
to get our predicted values for the growth rate of GNP (YDOT). 
Let us first make some simple comparisons between our 
simulated values and our observed values over the test period. 
The observed mean over the period is .0184467 with a standard 
deviation of .0156911. The simulated mean is .0413731 with a 
standard deviation of .0067551 (See Table 3.4). From simple 
visual examination, we see that the simulation experiment 
yielded GNP growth rates which were not only higher, on 
average, but were also more stable (the standard deviation was 
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2.32 times as small). A graphical representation of this 
relationship can be found in Figure 3.2. 
Given these results for our simulation, we can take these 
predictions farther. Let us look at predictions from this 
model over a larger time period. Since our data sets are 
quarterly through 1988, we can compare predictions to observed 
values through this time period (for a graphical 
representation, see Figure 3.3). Over the time period of 
1979.4 through 1988.4, we see an observed mean growth rate of 
.0183889 with a standard deviation of .0103227. Compare that 
to a simulated growth rate mean of .0412880 and standard 
deviation of .0072417 (See Table 3.5). We can see that, even 
over a longer period of time, stable money growth leads to a 
more stable growth of nominal income. 
Now that we have our predictions, we need to make sure 
that these predictions have some degree of reliability 
associated with them. First of all, we must look at the 
within-sample predictions (YSTAT) of the model. A graphical 
comparison of these and observed values can be found in Figure 
3.4. We must compare our predictive model to the naive 
forecast (that is, a one step ahead forecast). If our model 
does not predict GNP growth rates better that the naive 
forecast, we cannot be confident in our simulated predictions. 
Our test uses the Theil Inequality Coefficient (Theil's U)17. 
If our model does not predict as well as the naive forecast, 
then our U will be greater than one; if it predicts as well
Predicted va lues for t he growth r a t e of GNP (YDOT) and observed v a l u e s 
for t he GNP growth ra te (DGNP) dur ing the "Monetarist Exper iment" 
1980 1981 1982 
DGNP YDOT 
Quarterly predic t ions for the growth ra te of GNP (YDOT) and q u a r t e r l y 
observed va lues for GNP growth (DGNP) 1979.4 t h rough 1988.4 
DGNP YDOT 
Quarter ly stat ic forecas ts for the growth ra te of n o m i n a l GNP (YSTAT) 
and observed v a l u e s for GNP growth (DGNP) w i t h i n sample 1962.1-1979.3 
YSTAT DGNP 
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the naive forecast, U will equal one; and if it predicts 
better than the naive forecast, U will be less than one. 
Micro-TSP calculates Theil's U for us. Please see Table 3.6 
for Micro-TSP output of the Theil's U. As we can see, Theil's 
U for our within sample forecasts is equal to .181867 which is 
less than one. Therefore, we can say that our model predicts 
better than the naive forecast. 
Because we have concluded that our model is adequate and 
our predictions are reliable, we must examine the implications 
this has in terms of evaluating monetarism and subsequent 
policy decisions. In Chapter Four we will discuss these 
implications. 
Table 3.4 
Descriptive Statistics for 
Actual GNP Growth (DGNP) and 
Simulated GNP Growth (YDOT) 
Sample Period 1979.4 through 1982.3 
Number of Observations - 12 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Max M m 
DGNP 
YDOT 
0184467 
0413731 
.0156911 
. 0067551 
.0434610 
.0546058 
0031962 
0304660 
Table 3.5 
Sample Period 1979.4 through 1988.4 
Number of Observations - 3 7 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Max M m 
DGNP 
YDOT 
0183889 
0412880 
. 0103227 
.0072417 
. 0434610 
.0562357 
0031962 
0287029 
Table 3.6 
Theil U Test on 
Within Sample Forecasts 
Forecast Series - YSTAT 
Forecast Evaluation - 71 Observations 
Root Mean Squared Error .008321 
Mean Absolute Error .006541 
Mean Absolute Percentage Error 45.18691 
Theil Inequality Coefficient .181867 
Bias Proportion 1.88E-17 
Variance Proportion .328271 
Covariance Proportion .671729 
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Chapter Four 
Policy Implications and Conclusions 
Policy Implications 
Given these results from our simulation experiment, what 
implications can this have for Federal Reserve policy? We 
have observed nominal GNP growth rates which are unstable over 
the entire period (1962.1 through 1988.4). We have also 
observed unstable monetary growth over the period, 
particularly over the period called the "Monetarist 
Experiment." Now, given our statistical model, we see a 
relationship between money supply growth and nominal GNP 
growth. Because we understand this relationship, we can 
expand our interpretation of our statistics to say that since 
there is a positive relationship between money supply growth 
and nominal GNP growth, we can also say that there is a 
relationship between monetary instability and GNP instability. 
What does this tells us about the objectives of Federal 
Reserve policy? 
The goal of monetary stabilization policy is not to 
insure steady growth of nominal income. It is, instead, to 
target short term macroeconomic phenomena such as unemployment 
and nominal interest rates. There are some serious problems 
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with this type of policy. The obvious problem is that 
stabilization policy ignores the growth of the entire economy. 
By targeting only the unemployment rate, the Federal Reserve 
ignores the importance of stable GNP growth. Another problem 
with this type of policy is that short-term macroeconomic 
variables are controlled only in the nominal sense. Long-run 
rates of real GNP growth or unemployment cannot be controlled 
by the Federal Reserve. By trying to control macroeconomic 
variables in the short-run, the Federal Reserve is likely to 
forego long-term economic stability. 
In terms of policy, the Federal Reserve, in order to 
conduct a true monetarist experiment, must abandon the 
attempted exploitation of the Phillips curve and seek to 
insure a stable rate of growth for the economy through stable 
money supply growth. Short-run fluctuations in monetary 
growth lead to fluctuations in the growth of nominal income. 
This leads to unstable expectations of inflation and 
instability in the economy. 
Conclusions 
The Federal Reserve announced, in 1979, that they would 
be implementing monetarist principles with regards to monetary 
policy. This experiment lasted from the fourth quarter of 
1979 through the third quarter of 1982. Because this period 
was characterized by economic instability, opponents of 
55 
monetarism labeled the experiment as a failure of monetarism. 
As the results of this paper have shown, this experiment was 
decidedly non-monetarist in its implementation because 
monetary aggregates showed unstable growth and the objectives 
of Federal Reserve policy never changed. Therefore, 
monetarism is not dead, as opponents of monetarism believe, or 
want to believe. In fact, this Federal Reserve experiment has 
served only to strengthen the monetarist position. 
We have discussed the principles of monetarism at length 
throughout this paper. We know that monetarists recommend 
steady growth rates for the money supply to insure steady 
growth of nominal income. We also know that fiscal policy is 
ineffective in terms of changing nominal income; in other 
words, money matters. 
To expound upon the most important aspect of monetarism, 
that is steady growth of money, what does that really mean for 
policy? Monetarists do not say that the Federal Reserve 
should indiscriminately change growth rates for money just 
because money matters. In fact, in it's most basic sense, 
monetarism says to leave the economy alone and allow it to 
function. Simply allow the money supply to grow at a steady 
rate, one which is in line with the long-run growth rate of 
the economy. Monetarism is not a recipe for implementing 
discretionary monetary policy in order to affect short-run 
changes in macroeconomic variables. Rather, monetarism is 
reaffirmation of the idea that markets work without outside 
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interference. Similar to Rational Expectations, monetarism is 
a philosophy which is in favor of limiting policy, both 
monetary and fiscal, such that the economy is allowed to 
adjust for economic phenomena on its own, without interference 
from policy-makers who are concerned with the short-run.18 
In its most basic sense, monetarism is a reaffirmation of 
everything that free-market Economists believe. Because the 
economy is dependent on the expectations of market players, 
stability of those expectations is of paramount importance 
with respect to maintaining a stable economy. Economists 
maintain that these expectations are rational and that markets 
work efficiently and can adjust, on their own, to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. If this is true, then short-run 
stabilization is not only unnecessary, but potentially harmful 
because it can alter short-run expectations and disrupt the 
efficiency of markets. Those who favor discretionary 
stabilization and "fine-tuning" of the economy must have 
doubts about the efficiency of markets and the rationality of 
market participants. 
Monetarism is an important component of Capitalism. 
Monetarists reject short-run stabilization and interference 
with free markets in favor of long-run stability of the 
economy based on a stable rate of inflation and the 
rationality of market participants and their expectations. 
Notes 
1. Macesich lists an abridged version of the monetarist 
view set forth by Milton Friedman in his essay "Counter 
Revolution in Monetary Theory, 1991." 
2. Friedman sets forth Fisher's examples and refers to him 
as the greatest American Economist (Monetarist 
Economics. 3-4). 
3. Keynes admits that in inflationary periods, contraction 
of the money supply through stricter reserve requirements 
could have an impact on interest rates and nominal income 
(Miller and Pulsinelli 187-188). 
4. The New Keynesians during the 1970's seemed to change 
their views concerning monetary policy. In his article 
"The Monetarist Controversy, or Should We Forsake 
Stabilization Policies?" Franco Modigliani, who is a 
leading non-monetarist economist concedes that the debate 
is no longer about whether or not monetary policy was 
an effective tool. The debate is now more concentrated 
on the issue of whether or not the economy can be 
stabilized and if so, "should the government be trusted 
with the necessary power." 
5. There is a belief on the part of some economists that 
monetary policy is nothing more than an extension of 
public finance where inflated money serves as a tax. 
Interest collected through the sale of government 
securities is eventually piped back into the Treasury 
and used for public policy objectives. 
6. Dallas Batten and Daniel Thornton discover three major 
criticisms of A-J that have been levied over the years 
and they respond to them, successfully, in "The Monetary 
Fiscal Policy Debate and the Anderson-Jordan Equation." 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. (October 1986) 
7. from Friedman, Milton and Anna Schwartz. Monetary 
Statistics of the United States. New York. Columbia 
University Press. for the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1970. 
8. The Federal Reserve cites recent financial innovations as 
having a blurring affect on the definition of money and 
have made the Ml and M2 aggregates more difficult to 
achieve. This is discussed in detail by Anthony Solomon 
in "Financial Innovation and Monetary Policy," in the 
1981 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. 
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9. from "Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their 
Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization." Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (November, 1968), 11-24. 
10. Statistical tables and figures are derived directly 
from Micro TSP. 
11. For a discussion of the F-test on the ratio of variances, 
see Pfaffenberger and Patterson 560-2. 
12. Data is compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Business Statistics. 
13. from "Counter Revolution in Monetary Theory" by 
Milton Friedman. 
14. This is the formula for calculating our test statistic: 
F = (SSRr/SSRy - 1) (N - Ku - 1/q) 
Where SSRr is the sum of squared residuals of the 
restricted regression, SSRU is the sum of squared 
residuals in the unrestricted regression, N is the number 
of observations, Ku is the number of right side variables 
in the unrestricted regression, and q is the number of 
restrictions (3, in our model). This test statistic is 
distributed as an F with q degrees of freedom in the 
numerator and N-Ku-1 degrees of freedom in the 
denominator. Inserting values into our equation, we 
calculate our test statistic to be 1.6404085 (Newbold 
and Bos 90-1). 
15. The existence of autocorrelation within a classical 
linear regression has important consequences for the 
model since a classical model assumes that 
autocorrelation does not exist. The problem with 
estimating a linear ordinary least squares model where 
autocorrelation exists is that the coefficient is no 
longer the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). It is 
still linear and unbiased but it is no longer efficient 
(minimum variance). This can affect our treatment of 
coefficients in that we may tend to call them 
insignificant when in fact they are significant (Gujarati 
362-63). That does not appear to be a problem in this 
model, but we must still test for autocorrelation. 
16. R2 is a measure of "goodness of fit." It is defined as 
the Explained Sum of Squares divided by the Total Sum of 
Squares. This ratio tells us how much variation in the 
dependent variable (DGNP) is explained by our regression. 
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As most econometrics experts will agree, falling in love 
with R2 is a dangerous proposition. A low R2 value does 
not always mean that the regression is ineffective nor 
does a high one mean that the model is exceptional. It 
is merely a measure which can help to identify the 
explanatory power of the model (Newbold and Bos 61). 
17. For a discussion of Theil's U test see Newbold and Bos 
(449-51). 
18. Because of its similarity to monetarism in this respect, 
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis is sometimes 
considered a branch of monetarism, and not totally non-
monetarist. Furthermore, monetarists and Rational 
Expectationalists see economic "fine-tuning" as the 
introduction of additional uncertainty into an economy 
where a degree of uncertainty already exists. 
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